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<@tmpl.guide
title="FIPS 140-2 support"
summary="Configure {project_name} server for FIPS compliance."
includedOptions="">

The Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 140-2, (FIPS 140-2), is a U.S. government computer security standard used to approve cryptographic modules. {project_name} supports running in FIPS 140-2 compliant mode. In this case, {project_name} will use only FIPS approved cryptography algorithms for its functionality.

To run in FIPS 140-2, {project_name} should run on a FIPS 140-2 enabled system. This requirement usually assumes RHEL or Fedora where FIPS was enabled during installation.
See https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/9/html-single/security_hardening/index#assembly_installing-the-system-in-fips-mode_security-hardening[RHEL documentation]
for the details. When the system is in FIPS mode, it makes sure that the underlying OpenJDK is in FIPS mode as well and would use only
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/openjdk/17/html/configuring_openjdk_17_on_rhel_with_fips/openjdk-default-fips-configuration[FIPS enabled security providers].

To check that the system is in FIPS mode, you can check it with the following command from the command line:

[source,bash]
----
fips-mode-setup --check
----

If the system is not in FIPS mode, you can enable it with the following command, however it is recommended that system is in FIPS mode since the installation rather than subsequently enabling it as follows:

[source,bash]
----
fips-mode-setup --enable
----

== BouncyCastle library

{project_name} internally uses the BouncyCastle library for many cryptography utilities. Please note that the default version of the BouncyCastle library that shipped with {project_name} is not FIPS compliant;
however,  BouncyCastle also provides a FIPS validated version of its library. The FIPS validated BouncyCastle library is not shipped with {project_name} as 
{project_name} cannot provide official support of it. Therefore, to run in FIPS compliant mode, you need to download BouncyCastle-FIPS bits and add them to the {project_name} distribution.
When {project_name} executes in fips mode, it will use the BCFIPS bits instead of the default BouncyCastle bits, which achieves FIPS compliance.

=== BouncyCastle FIPS bits

BouncyCastle FIPS can be downloaded from the https://www.bouncycastle.org/download/bouncy-castle-java-fips/[BouncyCastle official page]. Then you can add them to the directory
`KEYCLOAK_HOME/providers` of your distribution. Make sure to use proper versions compatible with BouncyCastle {project_name} dependencies. The supported BCFIPS bits needed are:

* bc-fips version ${properties["bouncycastle.bcfips.version"]}.
* bctls-fips version ${properties["bouncycastle.bctls-fips.version"]}.
* bcpkix-fips version ${properties["bouncycastle.pkixfips.version"]}.
* bcutil-fips version ${properties["bouncycastle.bcutilfips.version"]}.

== Generating keystore

You can create either `pkcs12` or `bcfks` keystore to be used for the {project_name} server SSL.

=== PKCS12 keystore

The `p12` (or `pkcs12`) keystore (and/or truststore) works well in BCFIPS non-approved mode.

PKCS12 keystore can be generated with OpenJDK 21 Java on RHEL 9 in the standard way. For instance, the following command can be used to generate the keystore:

[source,bash]
----
keytool -genkeypair -sigalg SHA512withRSA -keyalg RSA -storepass passwordpassword \
  -keystore $KEYCLOAK_HOME/conf/server.keystore \
  -alias localhost \
  -dname CN=localhost -keypass passwordpassword
----

The `pkcs12` keystores in FIPS mode *do not* manage secret (symmetric) keys. This limitation is imposed by the `BCFIPS` provider which does not allow this type of keys inside the `pkcs12` keystore type.

When the system is in FIPS mode, the default `java.security` file is changed in order to use FIPS enabled security providers, so no additional configuration is needed. Additionally, in the PKCS12 keystore, you can store PBE (password-based encryption) keys simply by using the keytool command, which makes it ideal for using it with {project_name} KeyStore Vault and/or to store configuration properties in the KeyStore Config Source. For more details, see the <@links.server id="configuration"/> and the <@links.server id="vault"/>.

=== BCFKS keystore

BCFKS keystore generation requires the use of the BouncyCastle FIPS libraries and a custom security file.

You can start by creating a helper file, such as `/tmp/kc.keystore-create.java.security`. The content of the file needs only to have the following property:

[source]
----
securerandom.strongAlgorithms=PKCS11:SunPKCS11-NSS-FIPS
----

Next, enter a command such as the following to generate the keystore:

[source,bash]
----
keytool -keystore $KEYCLOAK_HOME/conf/server.keystore \
  -storetype bcfks \
  -providername BCFIPS \
  -providerclass org.bouncycastle.jcajce.provider.BouncyCastleFipsProvider \
  -provider org.bouncycastle.jcajce.provider.BouncyCastleFipsProvider \
  -providerpath $KEYCLOAK_HOME/providers/bc-fips-*.jar \
  -alias localhost \
  -genkeypair -sigalg SHA512withRSA -keyalg RSA -storepass passwordpassword \
  -dname CN=localhost -keypass passwordpassword \
  -J-Djava.security.properties=/tmp/kc.keystore-create.java.security
----

WARNING: Using self-signed certificates is for demonstration purposes only, so replace these certificates with proper certificates when you move to a production environment.

Similar options are needed when you are doing any other manipulation with keystore/truststore of `bcfks` type.

== Running the server.

To run the server with BCFIPS in non-approved mode, enter the following command::

<@kc.start parameters="--features=fips --hostname=localhost --https-key-store-password=passwordpassword --log-level=INFO,org.keycloak.common.crypto:TRACE,org.keycloak.crypto:TRACE"/>

NOTE: In non-approved mode, the default keystore type (as well as default truststore type) is PKCS12. Hence if you generated a BCFKS keystore as described above,
it is also required to use the command `--https-key-store-type=bcfks`. A similar command might be needed for the truststore as well if you want to use it.

NOTE: You can disable logging in production if everything works as expected.

== Strict mode

There is the `fips-mode` option, which is automatically set to `non-strict` when the `fips` feature is enabled. This means to run BCFIPS in the "non-approved mode".
The more secure alternative is to use `--features=fips --fips-mode=strict` in which case BouncyCastle FIPS will use "approved mode".
Using that option results in stricter security requirements on cryptography and security algorithms.

NOTE: In strict mode, the default keystore type (as well as default truststore type) is BCFKS. If you want to use a different keystore type
it is required to use the option `--https-key-store-type` with appropriate type. A similar command might be needed for the truststore as well if you want to use it.

When starting the server, you can check that the startup log contains `KC` provider with the note about `Approved Mode` such as the following:

[source]
----
KC(BCFIPS version 2.0 Approved Mode, FIPS-JVM: enabled) version 1.0 - class org.keycloak.crypto.fips.KeycloakFipsSecurityProvider,
----

=== Cryptography restrictions in strict mode

* As mentioned in the previous section, strict mode may not work with `pkcs12` keystore. It is required to use another keystore (like `bcfks`) as mentioned earlier. Also `jks` and `pkcs12` keystores are not
supported in {project_name} when using strict mode. Some examples are importing or generating a keystore of an OIDC or SAML client in the Admin Console or for a `java-keystore` provider in the realm keys.

* User passwords must be 14 characters or longer. {project_name} uses PBKDF2 based password encoding by default. BCFIPS approved mode requires passwords to be at least 112 bits
(effectively 14 characters) with PBKDF2 algorithm. If you want to allow a shorter password, set the property `max-padding-length` of provider `pbkdf2-sha512` of SPI `password-hashing`
to 14 to provide additional padding when verifying a hash created by this algorithm. This setting is also backwards compatible with previously stored passwords.
For example, if the user's database is in a non-FIPS environment and you have shorter passwords and you want to verify them now with {project_name} using BCFIPS in approved mode, the passwords should work.
So effectively, you can use an option such as the following when starting the server:

[source]
----
--spi-password-hashing-pbkdf2-sha512-max-padding-length=14
----

NOTE: Using the option above does not break FIPS compliance. However, note that longer passwords are good practice anyway. For example, passwords auto-generated by modern browsers match this
requirement as they are longer than 14 characters. If you want to omit the option for max-padding-length, you can set the password policy to your realms to have passwords at least 14 characters long.

NOTE: When you are migrating from {project_name} older than 24, or if you explicitly set the password policy to override the default hashing algorithm, it is possible that some of your users use an older
algorithm like `pbkdf2-sha256`. In this case, consider adding  the `--spi-password-hashing-pbkdf2-sha256-max-padding-length=14` option to ensure that users having their passwords hashed with
the older `pbkdf2-sha256` can log in because their passwords may be shorter than 14 characters.

* RSA keys of 1024 bits do not work (2048 is the minimum). This applies for keys used by the {project_name} realm itself (Realm keys from the `Keys` tab in the admin console), but also client keys and IDP keys

* HMAC SHA-XXX keys must be at least 112 bits (or 14 characters long). For example if you use OIDC clients with the client authentication `Signed Jwt with Client Secret` (or `client-secret-jwt` in
the OIDC notation), then your client secrets should be at least 14 characters long. Note that for good security, it is recommended to use client secrets generated by the {project_name} server, which
always fulfils this requirement.

* The bc-fips version 1.0.2.4 deals with the end of the transition period for PKCS 1.5 RSA encryption. Therefore JSON Web Encryption (JWE) with algorithm `RSA1_5` is not allowed in strict mode by default (BC provides the system property `-Dorg.bouncycastle.rsa.allow_pkcs15_enc=true` as backward compatibility option for the moment). `RSA-OAEP` and `RSA-OAEP-256` are still available as before.

== Other restrictions

To have SAML working, make sure that a `XMLDSig` security provider is available in your security providers.
To have Kerberos working, make sure that a `SunJGSS` security provider is available. In FIPS enabled RHEL 9 in OpenJDK 21, the `XMLDSig` security provider may be already enabled
in the `java.security` by default and the same applies with latest OpenJDK 17. But with older OpenJDK 17, it may not be enabled by default, which means that SAML effectively cannot work.

To have SAML working, you can manually add the provider into `JAVA_HOME/conf/security/java.security` into the list fips providers. For example, add the line such as the following in case
that it is not already available in your FIPS security providers:

[source]
----
fips.provider.7=XMLDSig
----

Adding this security provider should work well. In fact, it is FIPS compliant and is already added by default in the OpenJDK 21 and newer versions of OpenJDK 17.
Details are in the https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1940064[bugzilla].

NOTE: It is recommended to look at `JAVA_HOME/conf/security/java.security` and check all configured providers here and make sure that the number matches. In other words, `fips.provider.7`
assumes that there are already 6 providers configured with prefix like `fips.provider.N` in this file.

If you prefer not to edit your `java.security` file inside java itself, you can create a custom java security file (for example named `kc.java.security`) and add only the single
property above for adding XMLDSig provider into that file. Then start your {project_name} server with this property file attached:

[source]
----
-Djava.security.properties=/location/to/your/file/kc.java.security
----

For Kerberos/SPNEGO, the security provider `SunJGSS` is not yet fully FIPS compliant. Hence it is not recommended to add it to your list of security providers
if you want to be FIPS compliant. The `KERBEROS` feature is disabled by default in {project_name} when it is executed on FIPS platform and when security provider is not
available. Details are in the https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2051628[bugzilla].

The algorithm `EdDSA` cannot be used in FIPS mode. Although the current `BCFIPS` provider supports `Ed25519` and `Ed448` curves, the resulting keys do not implement the standard JDK interfaces to manage them (`EdECKey`, `EdECPublicKey`, `EdECPrivateKey`,...), and {project_name} cannot use them for signatures.

== Run the CLI on the FIPS host

If you want to run Client Registration CLI (`kcreg.sh|bat` script) or Admin CLI (`kcadm.sh|bat` script),
 the CLI must also use the BouncyCastle FIPS dependencies instead of plain BouncyCastle dependencies. To achieve this, you may copy the
jars to the CLI library folder and that is enough. CLI tool will automatically use BCFIPS dependencies instead of plain BC when
it detects that corresponding BCFIPS jars are present (see above for the versions used). For example, use command such as the following before running the CLI:

[source]
----
cp $KEYCLOAK_HOME/providers/bc-fips-*.jar $KEYCLOAK_HOME/bin/client/lib/
cp $KEYCLOAK_HOME/providers/bctls-fips-*.jar $KEYCLOAK_HOME/bin/client/lib/
cp $KEYCLOAK_HOME/providers/bcutil-fips-*.jar $KEYCLOAK_HOME/bin/client/lib/
----

NOTE: When trying to use BCFKS truststore/keystore with CLI, you may see issues due this truststore is not the default java keystore type. It can be good to specify it as default in java
security properties. For example run this command on unix based systems before doing any operation with kcadm|kcreg clients:

[source]
----
echo "keystore.type=bcfks
fips.keystore.type=bcfks" > /tmp/kcadm.java.security
export KC_OPTS="-Djava.security.properties=/tmp/kcadm.java.security"
----

== {project_name} server in FIPS mode in containers

When you want {project_name} in FIPS mode to be executed inside a container, your "host" must be using FIPS mode as well. The container
will then "inherit" FIPS mode from the parent host.
See https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/9/html/security_hardening/using-the-system-wide-cryptographic-policies_security-hardening#enabling-fips-mode-in-a-container_using-the-system-wide-cryptographic-policies[this section]
in the RHEL documentation for the details.

The {project_name} container image will automatically be in fips mode when executed from the host in FIPS mode.
However, make sure that the {project_name} container also uses BCFIPS jars (instead of BC jars) and proper options when started.

Regarding this, it is best to build your own container image as described in the <@links.server id="containers"/> and tweak it to use BCFIPS etc.

For example in the current directory, you can create sub-directory `files` and add:

* BC FIPS jar files as described above
* Custom keystore file - named for example `keycloak-fips.keystore.bcfks`
* Security file `kc.java.security` with added provider for SAML (Not needed with OpenJDK 21 or newer OpenJDK 17)

Then create `Containerfile` in the current directory similar to this:

.Containerfile:
[source,dockerfile,subs="attributes+"]
----
FROM quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:{containerlabel} as builder

ADD files /tmp/files/

WORKDIR /opt/keycloak
RUN cp /tmp/files/*.jar /opt/keycloak/providers/
RUN cp /tmp/files/keycloak-fips.keystore.* /opt/keycloak/conf/server.keystore
RUN cp /tmp/files/kc.java.security /opt/keycloak/conf/

RUN /opt/keycloak/bin/kc.sh build --features=fips --fips-mode=strict

FROM quay.io/keycloak/keycloak:{containerlabel}
COPY --from=builder /opt/keycloak/ /opt/keycloak/

ENTRYPOINT ["/opt/keycloak/bin/kc.sh"]
----

Then build FIPS as an optimized Docker image and start it as described in the <@links.server id="containers"/>. These steps require that you use arguments as described above when starting the image.

== Migration from non-fips environment

If you previously used {project_name} in a non-fips environment, it is possible to migrate it to a FIPS environment including its data. However, restrictions and considerations exist as
mentioned in previous sections, namely:

* Starting with {project_name} 25, the default algorithm for password hashing is `argon2`. However, this algorithm is not supported for FIPS 140-2. This means that if your users hashed their password
with `argon2`, they will not be able to login after switch to the FIPS environment. If you plan to migrate to the FIPS environment, consider setting the
Password policy for your realm from the beginning (before any users are created) and override the default algorithm for example to `pbkdf2-sha512`, which is FIPS compliant. This strategy helps to make the
migration to the FIPS environment to be smooth. Otherwise, if your users are already on `argon2` passwords, simply ask users to reset the password after migrating to the FIPS
environment.  For instance, ask users to use "Forget password" or send the email for reset-password to all users.
* Make sure all the {project_name} functionality relying on keystores uses only supported keystore types. This differs based on whether strict or non-strict mode is used.
* Kerberos authentication may not work. If your authentication flow uses `Kerberos` authenticator, this authenticator will be automatically switched to `DISABLED` when migrated to FIPS
environment. It is recommended to remove any `Kerberos` user storage providers from your realm and disable `Kerberos` related functionality in LDAP providers before switching to FIPS environment.

In addition to the preceding requirements, be sure to doublecheck this before switching to FIPS strict mode:

* Make sure that all the {project_name} functionality relying on keys (for example, realm or client keys) use RSA keys of at least 2048 bits

* Make sure that clients relying on `Signed JWT with Client Secret` use at least 14 characters long secrets (ideally generated secrets)

* Password length restriction as described earlier. In case your users have shorter passwords, be sure to start the server with the max padding length set to 14 of PBKDF2 provider as mentioned
earlier. If you prefer to avoid this option, you can for instance ask all your users to reset their password (for example by the `Forgot password` link) during the first authentication in the new environment.


== {project_name} FIPS mode on the non-fips system

{project_name} is supported and tested on a FIPS enabled RHEL 8 system and `ubi8` image. It is supported with RHEL 9 (and `ubi9` image) as well. Running on
the non-RHEL compatible platform or on the non-FIPS enabled platform, the FIPS compliance cannot be strictly guaranteed and cannot be officially supported.

If you are still restricted to running {project_name} on such a system, you can at least update your security providers configured in `java.security` file. This update does not amount to FIPS compliance, but
at least the setup is closer to it. It can be done by providing a custom security file with only an overridden list of security providers as described earlier. For a list of recommended providers,
see the https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_build_of_openjdk/21/html/configuring_red_hat_build_of_openjdk_21_on_rhel_with_fips[OpenJDK 21 documentation].

You can check the {project_name} server log at startup to see if the correct security providers are used. TRACE logging should be enabled for crypto-related {project_name} packages as described in the Keycloak startup command earlier.

</@tmpl.guide>
